My only complaint is that the Walter Isaacson in some ways was not technical enough, not really understanding some of the many novel ideas presented. The author gives us the notion that Apple by using the 6502 had made a strategic mistake but not using the dominant Intel processor at the time, funny thing is Intel was not dominant at that time, rather Zilog with the Z80 was the dominant processor. Only when the IBM PC came out did Intel dominate the processor world.

While Steve Jobs was not at Apple at the time, Apple was one of the first customers of ARM, and was a key investor in them (10% owner). Thus the choice to go to ARM processors in the iPhone and iPad was kind of a return to the days of the Newton.

The book pointed out quite well that Xerox had invested in Apple and that Apple had the rights to use Xerox’s technology. Many people claim that Apple had ripped off Xerox, this book cleared up some of that. Apple did release on the Mac the Smalltalk programming environment, with the same user interface that Xerox created. Having used that software (which most people have not) it becomes very obvious that Apple made huge improvements to the user interface, this book like most books on the subject present the Apple ripped off Xerox side of this.

In particular, it has more effective nuclear weapons; virtually ceased development of safer and more effective nuclear weapons[page 19].

Is there such thing as a safe nuclear weapon? Or are the current ones unstable? if so maybe everyone needs to be told about this.

Although this would appear to be creating a potential new theatre of warfare, in fact space has been militarized for the better part of four decades. Weather, communications, navigation and reconnaissance satellites are increasingly essential elements in American military power[page 66].

So their attitude is let’s just take over all of it.

The U.S. approach to space has been one of dilatory drift[page 68].

Or maybe previous administrations recognized the truly international scope of outer space.

Taken together, the prospects for space war or “cyberspace war” represent the truly revolutionary potential inherent in the notion of military transformation[page 69].

Both true, although I suspect we have lost the cyberspace war already. Can you say “virus” or “spam”?

Activity today tends to drive out innovation for tomorrow. Second, the lack of an immediate military competitor contributes to a sense of complacency about the extent and duration of American military dominance[page 71].

Their argument is: “So lets make wars so that we can our military hardware current.”

And advanced forms of biological warfare that can “target” specific genotypes may transform biological warfare from the realm of terror to a politically useful tool[page 72].

Let’s just ignore the treaty on Biological warfare. Do treaties mean anything to these people?

The individual services also need to be given greater bureaucratic and legal standing if they are to achieve these goals. Though a full discussion of this issue is outside the purview of this study, the reduced importance of the civilian secretaries of the military departments and the service chiefs of staff is increasingly inappropriate to the demands of a rapidly changing technological, strategic and geopolitical landscape[page 72].

So the military knows best, and any oversite is bad. Our government was set up on the basis of balance of power. Get rid of the oversite and you have tryany.

Indeed, it is ironic that, as post-Cold-War military operations have become more sophisticated and more reliant on air power and longrange strikes, they have become less politically decisive[page 73].

They are less effective because what we hit is not what we thought is was. We rely on pictures too much. Remember in the first Iraq war, how after the first day we had destroyed all of the scud missiles, and all of Iraq’s airplanes, only to have a scud missile flying days later. Or how about blowing up the Chinese Embassy/Consulate in Bosnia. Satellites can be decieved, databases can be flat wrong. Real people on the ground provide real intelligence. I can make full size model airplanes that a satellite cannot tell from real.

Future soldiers may operate in encapsulated, climate-controlled, powered fighting suits, laced with sensors, and boasting chameleonlike “active” camouflage. “Skin-patch” pharmaceuticals help regulate fears, focus concentration and enhance endurance and strength. A display mounted on a soldier’s helmet permits a comprehensive view of the battlefield – in effect to look around corners and over hills – and allows the soldier to access the entire combat information and intelligence system while filtering incoming data to prevent overload. Individual weapons are more lethal, and a soldier’s ability to call for highly precise and reliable indirect fires – not only from Army systems but those of other services – allows each individual to have great influence over huge spaces[page 74].

Technology is not a replacement for strategy. Very high tech solutions can be subverted with simple and cheap solutions. World War 2 offers many examples, as do other more recent wars.

Under the “Land Warrior” program, some Army experts envision a “squad” of seven soldiers able to dominate an area the size of the Gettysburg battlefield – where, in 1863, some 165,000 men fought[page 74].

Not likely even in the open desert. Our current situation in Iraq shows otherwise.

Moreover, the Navy should accelerate efforts to develop other strike warfare munitions and weapons. In addition to procuring greater numbers of attack submarines, the Navy should convert four of its Trident ballistic missile submarines to conventional strike platforms, much as the Air Force has done with manned bombers[page 78].

Who is the target for these attack submarines? An attack submarine is designed to hit other ships, or other submarines. Is some other countries navy a threat to ours today?

Consequently, the Marine Corps should consider development of a “gunship” version of the V-22[page 80].

Has anyone ever seen an A10-Warthog? Great airplane, rugged, cheap, and highly manuverable. Unfortunately too cheap for Bush’s cronies to make ludicrously large amounts on, in inflated defense dollars.

The estimates all agree that the Clinton program is underfunded; the differences lie in gauging the amount of the shortage and range from about $26 billion annually to $100 billion annually, with the higher numbers representing the more rigorous analyses[page 81].

Funny how the higher number is automatically the more correct one.

As the annual federal budget has moved from deficit to surplus and more resources have become available, there has been no serious or sustained effort to recapitalize U.S. armed forces[page 82].

Once upon a time we called this a bonus, because we had won the cold war.

For example, CSIS estimates that the cost of modernizing the current 1.37 millionman force would require procurement spending of $164 billion per year. While we might not agree with every aspect of the methodology underlying this calculation, the larger point is clear: if defense spending remains at current levels, as current plans under the QDR assume, the Pentagon would only be able to modernize a little more than half the force[page 84].

Maybe we did’nt need so large a force.

or U.S troops enforce a demilitarized zone on the Golan Heights[page 85].

Not in my lifetime. I can’t image the American people allowing this to happen.

Nevertheless, we believe that, over time, the program we advocate would require budgets roughly equal to those necessary to fully fund the QDR force – a minimum level of 3.5 to 3.8 percent of gross domestic product[page 87].

And our defense budget is greater than the all of the rest of world’s defense budgets combined. Remember Sparta?

this would result in a defense “topline” increase of $75 billion to $100 billion over that period, a small percentage of the $700 billion on budget surplus now projected for that same period[page 87].

But your boss spent all that surplus on tax cuts, and he still wants the increase.